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N.Y.C. SODA BAN MISCONCEPTIONS: WHY THE REAL ISSUE IS NOT FUNDAMENTAL 
CHRISTINE MANSOUR 
 
 
Introduction 
 As part of former Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s attempt to make New Yorkers healthier, 
several initiatives were passed. Smoking is now prohibited in restaurants and bars, a trans-fat ban 
was implemented throughout the entire city, and restaurants now post the calorie information of 
their meals on menus.1 However one of his initiatives to combat obesity, the Portion Cap Rule or 
as it is more commonly known the “Soda Ban,” has become the subject of much debate 
throughout the country. 
Many across the media including NPR, the New York Times, and Jon Stewart, have 
derided and lauded the ban.2 The ban has inspired so much discussion that the governor of 
Mississippi in 2013, as a response to New York City’s Portion Cap Rule, signed a law to prevent 
counties, districts, and towns from limiting portion sizes.3  This law mandated that only the 
legislature has the power to limit portion sizes because, as the governor claimed, “It is simply not 
the role of the government to micro-regulate citizens.”4  
The ban was passed in New York City by the Board of Health (“BOH”) and on its face 
limits all sugary drinks to 16-ounce cups.5 The ban defines a sugary drink as a “carbonated or 
non-carbonated beverage” that is non-alcoholic which was “sweetened by the manufacturer or 
                                                        
1 Michael Barbaro, Poll Shows New Yorkers Are Deeply Conflicted Over Bloomberg’s Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2013, at MB2. 
2 Fred Mogul, Unlike Soda Tax, Bloomberg Says Big Soda Size Ban is His Call, WNYC, (May 31, 2012), 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/213632-unlike-soda-tax-bloomberg-says-big-soda-size-ban-his-call/; Barbaro, supra 
note 1; The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast May 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-may-31-2012/drink-different---pick-your-poison. 
3 Holly Yan, No soda ban here: Mississippi passes ‘Anti-Bloomberg’ bill, CNN, (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/21/us/mississippi-anti-bloomberg-bill/. 
4 Id. 
5 Maximum Beverage Size, 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53 (2012). 
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establishment with sugar or another caloric sweetener” containing more than “25 calories per 8 
fluid ounces of beverage” and “does not contain more than 50 percent of milk or milk substitute 
by volume as an ingredient.”6 Yet, the rule provides numerous drink and location exemptions.7 It 
is not only the ban itself but also these exemptions that led to litigation based upon a claim that 
the ban violated separation of powers and was arbitrary and capricious.8 The New York City 
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene filed a motion for leave to appeal to the state’s highest 
court, which was granted, citing five issues the court should consider in relation to the ban.9 Part 
of the City’s argument was that the ban did not violate separation of powers nor was it arbitrary 
and capricious.10 The Court of Appeals of New York, in a 4-2 decision, affirmed the lower 
courts’ findings that the ban violated separation of powers in New York and the BOH “exceeded 
the scope of its regulatory authority by adopting the Portion Cap Rule.”11 Notably absent from all 
court decisions, but foremost in the public debate, was the issue of whether the ban attempts to 
regulate a fundamental liberty right: that of how much soda should the government allow citizens 
to drink and by extension a free speech right wherein purchase power is akin to speech. 
 This Note argues that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York was 
correct in determining that the BOH violated separation of powers.12 The Portion Cap Rule was 
an attempt by former Mayor Bloomberg and the BOH to usurp the legislative authority of the 
City Council, which was exclusively granted to the City Council in several N.Y.C. Charters. The 
                                                        
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 
2013 A.D. LEXIS 5423, at  *15 (N.Y. App. Div. July 30, 2013) (did not decide on arbitrary and capricious nature 
because the court determined it was invalid under separation of powers); In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 Misc. LEXIS 1216, at *35 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Mar. 11, 2013) (decided that the ban was arbitrary and capricious and violated separation of powers). 
9 Respondents - Appellants’ Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal to the N.Y. Court of Appeals at 4, (N.Y. 2013) 
(No. 653584/12). 
10 Id. at 2-3. 
11 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 
2014 N.Y. LEXIS 1442, at *24-25 (N.Y. June 26, 2004). 
12 Id. 
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implications in N.Y.C. of what the City argued for would have granted the Mayor and the BOH 
virtually unchecked legislative authority; this would be a clear violation of separation of powers 
as executive administrative agencies are supposed to enforce but not create laws.  
 Part I of this Note gives an overview of the obesity epidemic, its causes, and how much 
obesity-related healthcare costs. Part II examines the Portion Cap Rule itself and what the BOH 
has exempted from the rule. Part III analyzes the authority that the legislature granted to the 
BOH and what it actually allows the BOH to accomplish. Part IV discusses how the rule violated 
separation of powers, failed the four factor Boreali test, was arbitrary and capricious, and thus 
the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York was proper. Part V discusses why the 
issue in this case is not a fundamental liberty right and even if it were, the ban would nonetheless 
be unconstitutional. 
Part I: An Obesity Overview 
A. The Obesity Epidemic in the United States 
 Obesity, and its subsequent diseases, is the leading cause of preventable death in the 
United States, second only to smoking.13  From 1990 to 2010, the obesity rates in America 
dramatically increased. 14  Currently, more than a third of the American adult population is 
considered obese and the number continues to rise across racial, educational, gender, and 
socioeconomic demographics.15 Among children and adolescents obesity rates have tripled since 
                                                        
13 Mayor Bloomberg, Public Advocate DeBlasio, Manhattan Borough President Stringer, Montefiore Hospital CEO 
Safyer, Deputy Mayor Gibbs and Health Commissioner Farley Highlight Health Impacts of Obesity, NYC.gov (June 
5, 2012), 
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor_p
ress_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2012a%2Fpr
200-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1 (hereinafter Health Impacts of Obesity).  
14 Adult Obesity Facts, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Aug. 16 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html. 
15 What is Obesity?, OBESITY ACTION COALITION (2013),  http://www.obesityaction.org/understanding-
obesity/obesity (defining obesity as “[A] condition that is associated with having an excess of body fat, defined by 
genetic and environmental factors that are difficult to control when dieting… [H]aving a Body Mass Index (BMI) of 
30 or greater.”); Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 14. 
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1980; 17% of Americans aged 2-19 years old are now considered obese, making obesity the most 
common disease in children.16 However, unlike adults, there is a gender and racial gap when it 
comes to childhood obesity. Latino boys and African American girls are the populations most 
impacted by this disease.17  
The dangers associated with obesity are well known: it increases the risk for developing 
heart disease, diabetes, and hypertension to name only a few of the numerous health related 
consequences.18 In addition, there are numerous economic consequences to obesity not only for 
the individual but also for the United States health care system at the local, state, and federal 
levels. In 2008 alone, the total costs associated with obesity were over $157 billion; this includes 
direct costs, like treatment services, indirect costs, like insurance, and costs provided by 
Medicaid and Medicare. 19  The causes of obesity include a combination of several factors 
including genetics, environment, such as driving instead of walking, and diseases.20 Of these, an 
individual can only control the environmental factors, such as diet and exercise. 
B. Obesity in NYC 
 As of 2007, 22% of New Yorkers were classified as obese, with the highest rates in the 
poorer neighborhoods: 8.5% in Chelsea compared to 29.8% in East Harlem and more than 30% 
in the South Bronx.21 The direct health care costs to the city to treat and manage obesity are $4 
                                                        
16 Data and Statistics, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Jan. 11, 2013),  
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/childhood.html; What is Childhood Obesity?, OBESITY ACTION COALITION (2013) 
http://www.obesityaction.org/understanding-obesity-in-children/what-is-childhood-obesity (defining childhood 
obesity when a child’s BMI for age percentile is “[G]reater than 95 percent”). 
17 Data and Statistics, supra note 16. 
18 Causes and Consequences, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 27, 2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/causes/index.html. 
19 Id.; In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 Misc. at *10.  
20 Causes and Consequences, supra note 18. 
21 Jennifer L. Black & James Macinko, The Changing Distribution and Determinants of Obesity in the 
Neighborhoods of New York City, 2003-2007, 10 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 7 (2010).  
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billion and rising each year. 22  An estimated 5,800 New Yorkers die each year due to 
complications and diseases stemming from obesity.23 
 Among children, specifically the poorest children, obesity rates are higher.24 In 2006, 
more than 40% of New York City’s children enrolled in the Head Start program had BMIs 
classifying them as overweight or obese.25 For children, the dangers of childhood obesity are 
compounded by the potential of a lifelong struggle with weight and the resulting diseases. Obese 
children are more likely to develop Type II Diabetes at a younger age, suffer from asthma, 
experience joint pain and discomfort, and are at a 70% increased risk for cardiovascular 
disease. 26  Children who are overweight are more likely to become obese upon reaching 
adulthood. These overweight children, upon becoming obese adults, will put a further strain on 
the city’s health system in the future.27 
C. Major Environmental Sources of Obesity: Where does it come from? 
 The rise in sugary drink consumption and portion sizes account, in large part, for the rise 
in obesity.28 Between the 1950s and today, the standard portion size of a sugary drink has 
increased from between 6.5-12-ounces to a 42-ounce bottle made available in 2011.29  This 
increase in portion size has led to an increase in caloric intake from the sugary drinks.30 A 20-
                                                        
22 Mike Bloomberg, Combating Obesity, MIKE BLOOMBERG  
http://www.mikebloomberg.com/index.cfm?objectid=b7ee3b90-c29c-7ca2-fe35c0860a2075bd. 
23 Id. 
24 NYC Vital Signs – Obesity in Early Childhood, NYC.gov (Mar. 2006), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/survey/survey-2006childobesity.pdf. 
25 Id. 
26 Basics about Childhood Obesity, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 27, 2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/basics.html. 
27 Health Impacts of Obesity, supra note 13. 
28 A Growing Problem, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/problem.html; Sugary Drinks and Obesity Fact Sheet, HARVARD SCH. OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH (2013), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/sugary-drinks-fact-sheet/; Brief for 
Respondents-Appellants at 43, In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 A.D. 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (No. 653584/12). 
29 Sugary Drinks and Obesity Fact Sheet, supra note 28. 
30 Id. 
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ounce soda can contain between 15-18 teaspoons of sugar and more than 240 calories, while a 
64-ounce soda can have more than 700 calories.31 For instance, in 1955 a soda from McDonald’s 
was 7-ounces, while today it can be 32-ounces or larger.32 This phenomenon is not limited to 
McDonald’s; portion sizes in general have increased as well.33 For example, plate sizes have 
increased from 9 to 12 inches coinciding with larger portions and a rise in obesity.34  The 
availability of larger portions thus encourages people to eat more.35  
In addition, the beverage industry spends nearly half a billion dollars on advertising 
targeting children ages 2-17.36 These children become lifetime consumers of sugary drinks, yet 
they are also the ones hardest hit by the health impacts because they deal with a lifetime of 
struggle with weight and related complications. Studies have shown that the greater an 
individual’s consumption of sugary drinks, the more likely it is for that individual to be 
overweight or obese.37 This is due to the high sugar content and low satiety in the sugary 
drinks.38 The danger with sugary beverages in particular is that the body does not recognize the 
excess calories from sugar dissolved in water and this leads to additional calories being 
consumed to satiate the appetite.39 
D. Why target sugary drinks? 
                                                        
31 Id. 
32 Brief for Respondents-Appellants, supra note 28, at 43. 
33 A Growing Problem, supra note 28. 
34 The Leonard Lopate Show: Please Explain: Calories, (WNYC Broadcast Sept. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/please-explain-calories/. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Vasanti S. Malki et al., Intake of sugar-sweetened beverages and weight gain: a systematic review, 84 AM. J. 
CLINICAL NUTRITION 274, 274 (2006).  
38 Id. 
39 Brief for Respondents – Appellants, supra note 28, at 42 (quoting the Chair of the Dep’t of Nutrition at Harvard 
University’s Sch. of Public Health). 
8 
Sugary drinks are a leading driver of obesity and the largest component of the additional 
200-300 calories that Americans are consuming in comparison to 30 years ago.40 The former 
Mayor and the Board of Health (“BOH”) decided that the government needed to address the 
City’s rising obesity and diabetes rates.41 Due to the high consumption of sugary drinks and their 
connection to weight gain, both the former Mayor and the BOH believed that a cap on sugary 
drink portion sizes would be the best way to reduce obesity and diabetes rates of New Yorkers.42 
The Center for Disease Control, Let’s Move, and the American Heart Association, among others, 
supported the former Mayor and the BOH’s efforts to reduce obesity by capping the portion size 
of sugary drinks.43  
To reinforce their view that capping the portion size of sugary drinks would be the best 
way to combat obesity, the former Mayor and BOH cited several studies linking portion sizes 
with the amount people eat claiming that when people are given “larger portions [they] will eat 
more without recognizing that they are doing it.”44 However, the problem with the studies that 
former Mayor Bloomberg and the BOH relied on is that the author of the studies found those 
results when people were unknowingly given larger portions.45 When people are unknowingly 
given more, they are unlikely to notice a change in portion size.46 However, when consumers 
purchase a soda they are conscious of the size they are choosing to consume.47 People choose to 
                                                        
40 Id. at 42-44. 
41 Susan Kansagra, Maximum Size for Sugary Drinks: Proposed Amendment of Article 81, NYC.gov (June 12, 
2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/boh/max_size_sugary_drinks_BOH.pdf; Brief for Respondents 
– Appellants, supra note 28, at 41-45. 
42 Kansagra, supra note 41. 
43 Id.  
44 Id.; Brief for Respondents – Appellants, supra note 28, at 41-45. 
45 Brian Wansink & David Just, How Bloomberg’s Soft Drink Ban Will Backfire on NYC Public Health, THE 
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2012, 2:35PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/06/how-bloombergs-soft-
drink-ban-will-backfire-on-nyc-public-health/258501/. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
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purchase the 20, 48, or 64-ounce size sodas or refill their cups.48 The former Mayor and the BOH 
cite as a primary reason for the soda ban the fact that they believe that the government has a 
compelling interest in preventing obesity.49 
Part II. What is the ban and what are the exemptions? 
 The rule in controversy is 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53, which places a limit on the maximum 
size cup that a food service establishment (“FSE”) can offer to customers.50 The rule is former 
Mayor Bloomberg’s and the Board of Health’s response to the obesity epidemic that is striking 
New York City at the moment.51 The rule defines a sugary drink as a “carbonated or non-
carbonated beverage” that is non-alcoholic, “sweetened by the manufacturer or establishment 
with sugar or another caloric sweetener,” that has more than “25 calories per 8 fluid ounces of 
beverage,” and “does not contain more than 50 percent of milk or milk substitute by volume as 
an ingredient.” 52  The rule further stipulates that the volume of milk or milk substitute is 
“presumed to be less than or equal to 50 percent unless proven otherwise by the food service 
establishment serving it.”53 Milk substitute has been defined as “any liquid that is soy-based and 
is intended by its manufacturer to be a substitute for milk.”54 The rule also defines the maximum 
cup size that FSEs are allowed to sell.55 FSEs are unable to “sell, offer, or provide a sugary drink 
in a cup or container that is able to contain more than 16 fluid ounces,” yet FSEs may also not 
                                                        
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Maximum Beverage Size, 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53 (2013) (This was added by resolution to Article 81 in September 
2012. Enforcement has never occurred due to an injunction issued by Judge Tingling. It was struck from the code 
due to the decision from the Court of Appeals of New York). 
51 Brief for Respondents – Appellants, supra note 28, at 2. 
52 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(1). 
53 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53. 
54 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(2). 
55 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(3). 
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“sell, offer, or provide to any customer a self-service cup or container that is able to contain more 
than 16 fluid ounces.”56 
 It is first important to note that the rule does not apply to beverages mixed with alcohol.57 
Other drinks exempted under the rule include 100 percent fruit juices, fruit smoothies, 
milkshakes, and mixed coffee drinks.58 The next exemption in the rule is that soymilk is the only 
liquid allowed as a milk substitute, ruling out other milk substitutes such as rice, almond, or 
coconut milk.59  
On its face the rule appears to apply to all FSEs as defined under 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.03(s) 
but the BOH declared that convenience stores, corner markets, gas stations, bodegas, and “other 
similar businesses” would be exempt because those places are subject to inspection by the New 
York State Department of Agriculture and Markets (“Department of Agriculture”) and not under 
BOH control due to the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between the two 
departments.60 
In addition, the BOH counts as a single serving two and three liter bottles.61 If the goal is 
to limit portion sizes to encourage healthier choices and reduce obesity rates, how does counting 
a two or three liter bottle as a single serving accomplish that goal? Furthermore, during the 
proceedings in the New York Supreme Court, the BOH decided that it would allow 17-ounce 
                                                        
56 24 R.C.N.Y. §§ 81.53(3)(b-c). 
57 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(1)(A). 
58 Brief for Respondents – Appellants, supra note 28, at 27-8; Matter of N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce, 2013 A.D. at 9.  
59 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(2) (emphasis added); Janet Kinosian, Overwhelmed by Milk Substitutes?, AARP (Aug. 15, 
2012), http://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-08-2012/milk-substitutes-five-healthy-choices.html. 
60 Food Preparation and Food Establishments, Definitions, 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.03(s) (defining a food service 
establishment as “[A] place where food is provided for individual portion service directly to the consumer whether 
such food is provided free of charge or sold, and whether consumption occurs on or off the premises or is provided 
from a pushcart, stand or vehicle.”); Brief for Plaintiffs-Petitioners at 11, In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 A.D. 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (No. 
653584/12); In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 A.D. at 9-10. 
61 Brief for Plaintiffs-Petitioners, supra note 60, at 49. 
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cups thus changing the prior prohibition on 16.9-ounce bottles.62  This change to accommodate 
current bottle sizes in the middle of a trial exemplifies a critical issue with the ban: its arbitrary 
and capricious nature. As a rule, 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53 has so many exceptions that it truly does 
not prevent people from consuming more than 16-ounces of what the BOH and former Mayor 
Bloomberg considered to be a sugary drink. 
Part III: By Passing the Ban the BOH Has Exceeded Its Statutory Authority 
Administrative agencies do not have the same lawmaking or legislative power that has been 
vested with the legislature. The New York State Constitution provides for a separation of powers 
between the legislative and executive branches of local government.63 Courts have consistently 
respected the individual powers of each branch of government, requiring that neither branch 
invade the powers of the others.64 In New York City, the New York City Charter further protects 
this by vesting the City’s legislative power with the City Council and providing for distinct 
legislative and executive branches.65 It is the Mayor of New York who embodies the executive 
branch and has been granted the power to appoint heads of administrations and departments.66 
Even though the Mayor is empowered to “implement and enforce legislative pronouncements 
emanating from the Council…the Mayor ‘may not go beyond stated legislative policy and 
prescribe a remedial device not embraced by the policy.’”67 In order for the Mayor to be able to 
                                                        
62 Id. 
63 N.Y. Const. art. IX § 1(a) (“Every local government… [S]hall have a legislative body elective by the people 
thereof.”). 
64 Subcontractors Trade Ass’n v. Koch, 61 N.Y.2d 422, 427 (N.Y. 1984). 
65 Id.; Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 356 (N.Y.) (1985); 
N.Y.C. Charter § 21 (1989). 
66 N.Y.C. Charter § 3 (1988); N.Y.C. Charter § 6 (1967). 
67 Subcontractors Trade Ass’n, 61 N.Y.2d at 427 (quoting In re Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 642, 645-6 (N.Y. 
1976)). 
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devise plans to fix social problems, it is the legislature that must first delegate that power to the 
Mayor.68 
Through the New York City Charter, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene has the 
jurisdiction to “regulate all matters affecting health in the city of New York… perform all those 
functions and operations performed by the city that relate to the health of the people of the 
city.”69 Specifically, N.Y.C. Charter § 556 gives the BOH the power to regulate and supervise 
the milk and water supplies, determine the public health needs of the city, supervise and control 
communicable and chronic diseases, “supervise and regulate the food and drug supply of the 
city,” and promote or provide for public education and programs.70 Furthermore, N.Y.C. Charter 
§ 558 gives the BOH the power to “add to and alter, amend or repeal any part of the health code, 
and may therein publish additional provisions for security of life and health in the city and confer 
additional powers on the department not inconsistent with the constitution, laws of this state.”71 
The City argued that the BOH has legislative authority and the ability to issue substantive 
rules and standards in public health, citing Charters §§ 556 and 558.72 The City further argued 
that the BOH was given plenary powers of legislation by the New York City Charter Revision 
Commission.73 Citing cases decided before the 1989 amendments to the City Charter, the City 
argued that the Court of Appeals had recognized the plenary powers of the BOH to act “in a 
legislative capacity under State legislative authority.”74 In particular, the City cited to Grossman 
v. Baumgartner to underscore their position that the BOH has legislative power. 75  While 
Grossman did recognize that the Legislature “intended the Board to be the sole legislative 
                                                        
68 Id. at 429. 
69 N.Y.C. Charter § 556 (1988). 
70 N.Y.C. Charter §§ 556(c)(9), 556(d)(4-7). 
71 N.Y.C. Charter § 558(b) (1979). 
72 Brief for Respondents - Appellants, supra note 28, at 17. 
73 Id. at 18. 
74 Id. at 20. 
75 Id. at 21. 
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authority within the City of New York in the field of health regulation,” this was tempered with 
the recognition that the regulations should not be “inconsistent with or contrary to State laws 
dealing with the same subject matter.” 76  
Nevertheless, the health issue in Grossman was the direct link between tattooing and 
hepatitis and, again, this was decided before the 1989 amendment to the New York City Charter 
and before the 1979 amendment to N.Y.C. Charter § 558 clarifying the scope of the BOH’s 
power.77 In addition, unlike legislation enacted by the City Council or State Assembly, but 
consistent with other administrative actions, the BOH’s rules are subject to arbitrary and 
capricious review under Article 78.78  Furthermore, the BOH is subject to oversight by the State 
Public Health Council, Commissioner, and the Department of Health: departments that do not 
have any legislative ability or powers.79 It is difficult to understand how a board that is subject to 
oversight by non-legislative bodies can itself wield legislative powers.  
The dissent from the Court of Appeals of New York, however, advocated the position that 
the City’s approaches to public health support the BOH’s position due to the broad authority it 
had been given in the past and its “special structure” to address health issues expeditiously.80 The 
dissent further noted that New York’s highest court has characterized the BOH’s powers as 
legislative in the past and viewed the BOH’s authority as nearly legislative. 81  Judge Read 
continued by articulating that the prior amendments did not switch the BOH’s “source of 
                                                        
76 Grossman v. Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345, 351 (N.Y. 1966); Brief for Respondents - Appellants, supra note 28, at 
21. 
77 Grossman, 17 N.Y.2d at 349; Brief for Plaintiff - Petitioners, supra note 60, at 21(citing the Report of the Comm. 
on Health in Favor of Approving and Adopting a Local Law to Amend the N.Y.C. Charter in relation to Defining 
Powers of the Board of Health (1979) to show a concern for separation of powers: “[R]egulations passed by the 
Board of Health may be overly broad and so invade the providence of the City Council’s legislative authority.”). 
78 Patgin Carriages Co. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 28 Misc. 3d 1229(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
79 Brief for Plaintiff - Petitioners, supra note 60, at 22-23. 
80 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2014 N.Y. at *30. 
81 Id. at *39-41. 
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delegated powers from state legislature to the Council.”82 Moreover, Judge Read opined that the 
history of the BOH to regulate public health leads to the only conclusion that its regulations have 
“force and effect of state law” and therefore it is not required for the Council to authorize the 
regulation of sugary drinks.83 
The majority disagreed holding that the City Charter gave only regulatory and not legislative 
authority to the BOH.84 The majority continued that the Charter never granted the BOH authority 
to make laws and the 1979 amendments were made precisely to ensure that the BOH was not 
regulating too broadly and invading the legislative authority of the City Council.85 The majority 
reinforced this position by stating that “a rule had the force of law but it is not a law.”86 
Courts have agreed that the legislature may delegate its regulatory powers to administrative 
agencies, but that must be done “in light of the limitations that the Constitution imposes.”87 Even 
though it has been recognized that administrative agencies may be given the authority “to fill in 
details and interstices and to make subsidiary policy choices consistent with the enabling 
legislation,” creating a new rule is not interstitial.88 It is well settled law that when the executive, 
here former Mayor Bloomberg and the BOH, acts “inconsistently with the Legislature or usurps 
its prerogatives” the principle of separation of powers is violated. 89  Because the Court of 
Appeals of New York majority found that the BOH’s authority is regulatory not legislative, they 
continued to the issue of whether the BOH exceeded its regulatory authority by promulgating the 
                                                        
82 Id. at *44. 
83 Id. at *44-45. 
84 Id. at *10. 
85 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2014 N.Y. at *11-12. 
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Portion Cap Rule.90 This is in contrast to what the dissent found as the only issue in the case: 
whether the BOH acted within the bounds of its state delegated powers.91 
However, as the majority from the Court of Appeals of New York found, the Portion Cap 
Rule was legislation masquerading as a ban under the BOH. Only the City Council and the State 
Assembly can pass legislation in the city and state of New York. 
Part IV: The Soda Ban is Ultra Vires under the Boreali four factor test for separation of powers. 
 
 The leading case in New York to determine if a restriction or board action was properly 
adopted by an administrative agency and did not violate separation of powers is Boreali v. 
Axelrod.92 The issue in Boreali was whether the Public Health Council overstepped its delegated 
authority when it promulgated a comprehensive code to govern tobacco smoking in open public 
areas.93 The court created a four-factor analysis to determine if the administrative agency did 
violate separation of powers when enacting the new tobacco code.94 The first factor considered is 
if the regulatory scheme was “laden with exceptions based solely upon economic and social 
concerns.”95 The second is did the agency create “its own comprehensive set of rules without 
legislative guidance.”96 The third factor is did the agency act “in an area in which the Legislature 
had repeatedly tried -- and failed -- to reach agreement in the face of substantial public debate 
and vigorous lobbying by a variety of interested factions.”97 The fourth and final factor to be 
considered is if there was any “special expertise or technical competence in the field of health” 
involved in developing the regulation being challenged.98 When creating this test, the court was 
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foremost concerned about not allowing the legislature to cede its policy-making responsibility to 
an administrative agency, or to have an administrative agency seize power reserved for the 
legislature.99  
In Boreali, because the tobacco code failed the four-factor analysis, the Public Health 
Council was deemed to have “exceeded the permissible scope of its mandate by using it as a 
basis for engaging in inherently legislative activities.”100 For an agency to have exceeded its 
mandated authority, it is not necessary to have violated all four factors, but when the factors, 
viewed in combination, show that the agency engaged in a policy-making activity, this is found 
to be in violation of separation of powers.101 Once an agency engages in policy-making in an 
area where it has not been delegated authority, the agency has acted as the legislature and a 
regulation that violates separation of powers will be deemed invalid.102 
A. Did the ban balance competing concerns of public health and economic costs?103 
 
The presence of exemptions in this case is particularly telling when deciding the first 
Boreali factor against the former Mayor and BOH.104 This is because “exemptions typically run 
counter to such goals and cannot be justified as simple implementations of legislative values.”105 
It could not be said that the BOH acted solely with a view towards public health when the 
exemptions were taken into account.106 The exemptions listed in the ban regulate where someone 
can purchase large sugary drinks and what kind of large sugary drink they are purchasing.107 
Exempting grocery stores, convenience stores, corner markets, and gas stations but not movie 
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theaters, stadiums, or food trucks shows that in creating the rule the BOH weighed the potential 
benefits of obesity reduction with the economic impact upon these industries if they were not 
able to sell large sugary drinks.108 The same can be said for the exemption given to alcoholic 
beverages and milkshakes, some of which contain more sugar and calories than the large portion 
sodas.109  
The BOH defended these considerations by claiming that they are outside the scope of 
BOH regulations due to an MOU between the State Department of Health and the State 
Department of Agriculture and Markets. 110  The City further argued that sodas mixed with 
alcohol are also exempt because it is the New York State Alcoholic Beverage Control Law that 
regulates the sale of alcohol thus making it outside the scope of the BOH’s authority. 111 
However, the MOU cited calls for cooperative efforts among the agencies to assure food 
protection; there was no cooperation between agencies upon creating and implementing the 
ban.112 Moreover, the BOH has always retained the right to “apply generally applicable rules to 
alcohol and the establishments that serve it” by law.113 
Further proof of the weighing of economic factors against potential health benefits was 
found in the Health Commissioner’s own words.114 The Health Commissioner “went as far as to 
indicate that in addition to promoting health, the ban would help ameliorate obesity-related 
                                                        
108 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 A.D. at *18. 
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N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2012 N.Y.S. (N.Y. Sup Ct. 2013) (No. 653584/2012) (compare a pitcher 
of Coca-Cola with a pitcher of rum and Coca-Cola); In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of 
Commerce, 2013 A.D. at *9,*18. 
110 Brief for Appellants’ at 37, In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chamber of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
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N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2014 N.Y. (N.Y. 2014) (APL–2013-00291). 
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health care expenditures in New York.”115 The exemptions written into the rule show that the 
BOH compromised between competing social and economic concerns and private interests. The 
most notable of private interest exemptions is the ubiquitous 7-11 Big Gulp, which comes in 
sizes ranging from 20–50-ounces.116 7-11 received an exemption for its 50-ounce Double Big 
Gulp, which can have about 600 calories when filled with Coca-Cola, because it is a convenience 
store.117 The Court of Appeals of New York was not convinced that the exemptions in the rule 
were solely health related because the adoption of the Portion Cap Rule or “an outright 
prohibition of sugary beverages, that interferes with commonplace daily activities preferred by 
large numbers of people must necessarily wrestle with complex value judgments concerning 
personal autonomy and economics. That is policy-making, not rule-making.”118 
The BOH claimed that the regulation of FSEs to protect health has long been a core goal 
of the agency.119 However the BOH also admitted that, traditionally, the scope of power it had 
was with infectious diseases; it was in 2006 where the BOH expanded its scope to chronic 
diseases by regulating artificial trans fats.120 The goal of the soda ban was to discourage New 
Yorkers from consuming sugary drinks by placing a maximum on the possible size that could be 
ordered.121 This looked beyond health benefits and concerns by attempting to manipulate choices 
available to consumers.122 As the Court of Appeals of New York found, there were other ways 
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the BOH could have approached reducing soda intake besides banning some large sugary drinks 
in some FSEs.123 
This also ventured into lawmaking, something within the realm of the State Assembly 
and the City Council but not the BOH or the Mayor’s office. 124 What the BOH was doing with 
the rule was making soda or sugary drinks a more expensive choice for consumers by forcing 
them to purchase two 16-ounce cups instead of one 32-ounce cup. 125  By influencing, or 
attempting to influence, decisions that consumers make about their beverage choice and size, the 
Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division found that the decision by the BOH to regulate 
a product that was never categorized as dangerous is inherently a policy decision and thus for the 
Legislature to determine and not the BOH. 126  The Supreme Court of New York Appellate 
Division further found that the ban was “especially suited for legislative determination as it 
involves ‘difficult social problems’ which must be resolved by ‘making choices among 
competing ends.’”127 In other words, when weighing health concerns, consumer diet choices, and 
business financial interests, all the courts of New York determined that the task is best left to the 
Legislature to determine the best course of action to take, not the BOH or Mayor’s office.128 
Judge Read’s dissent argued that there is “no obvious reason why ‘economic 
consequences,’ ‘tax implications for small business owners’ and ‘personal autonomy’ are 
‘ends.’”129 Judge Read believed that these were factors the BOH properly must take into account 
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when determining the best way to obtain its public health goals. 130  Judge Read further 
determined that the BOH’s decision was the result of a cost benefit analysis that is performed 
daily and the “ends-means test” the majority notes under the first Boreali factor has no legal 
basis.131 Judge Read argued that the “proper standard for our review is whether the regulation is 
so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary” and that the Portion Cap 
Rule passed the test.132 
However, the abundance of exemptions and the failure of the BOH to work cooperatively 
with the Department of Agriculture were indicative of the fact that more than the health concerns 
of New Yorkers were being considered when the Portion Cap Rule was written.133 The BOH, 
when writing the rule, took into account non-health policy considerations effectively failing the 
first Boreali factor.134 
B. Did the agency write on a clean slate creating its own comprehensive set of rules without 
benefit of legislative guidance?135 
 
The second Boreali factor asks if the BOH wrote on a clean slate when it created the 
Portion Cap Rule. Administrative agencies are permitted to engage in interstitial rule-making. 
This occurs when an agency fills in the details of a broad legislative mandate to make it 
operational; when the agency goes beyond filling in it exceeds its limits on authority.136 In this 
case there was no existing gap that needed to be filled in by the Portion Cap Rule. 
The City cites the N.Y.C. Charter as giving the BOH a broad grant of general and 
specific authority to “regulate all matters affecting the health in the city of New York.”137 
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Additionally, the Charter states that the BOH has the power to “supervise the reporting and 
control of communicable and chronic diseases and conditions hazardous to life and health” and 
to “supervise and regulate the food and drug supply of the city.”138 Although the Court has 
upheld broad grants of authority to administrative agencies in the past, those cases were found to 
not have the same circumstances found in Boreali or did not have the exemptions that are present 
throughout the Portion Cap Rule.139 To further bolster the City’s position that the Portion Cap 
Rule did not write on a clean slate, the City cites 24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.61, which establishes 
nutrition requirements for group day care facilities. 140 Section 47.61, similar to the soda ban, 
limits the types of beverages that can be served to children. No child is to receive any beverage 
with “added sweeteners, artificial or natural,” children cannot be served more than “six (6) 
ounces of 100% juice per day,” and children age two and older can only be served “milk with 
1% or less milk-fat unless milk with a higher fat content is medically required.”141  
However, this rule affects all group day care facilities in N.Y.C. and does not affect sizes 
available for purchase by consumers. 142  Merely because there is rule affecting beverages 
available to children in controlled settings that does not provide the gap that is needed for the 
soda ban to pass the Boreali factors. The soda ban was written on a clean slate because it targets 
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consumer choices in only some FSEs.143 24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.67 does not have any gaps that the 
soda ban fills in. 
The State Assembly and City Council have struck down prior attempts to regulate soda; 
neither body has adopted a statute defining any policy toward soda consumption.144 The majority 
in the Court of Appeals of New York found that creating “an entirely new rule that significantly 
changes the manner in which sugary beverages are provided to customers at eating 
establishments is not an auxiliary selection of means to an end: it reflects a new policy 
choice.”145 The majority found that the BOH wrote the Portion Cap Rule without legislative 
guidance and did not fill in any independent legislation gaps.146 By enacting the Portion Cap 
Rule, the BOH wrote on a clean slate violating the second Boreali factor. 
C. Is the agency acting in an area that the legislature has repeatedly tried and failed to reach 
agreement?147 
 
If the legislature appears unable to agree on a way to solve a problem, or has repeatedly 
tried and failed, an agency cannot attempt to fill what it sees as a vacuum and impose its own 
solution. 148  Nonetheless, there is a distinction drawn between failed legislative action and 
legislative inaction. Inaction will not violate the Boreali factor, but failed legislative action 
will.149 In New York City and New York State, there have been several prior attempts to target 
sugary drinks and sodas.150 In the City, there were resolutions attempting to place warning labels 
on sugar sweetened beverages, to add certain sugary drinks to prohibited goods available for 
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food stamp purchase, and even to add an excise tax on sugar sweetened beverages, all of which 
failed.151 At the state level there were bills to prohibit the sale of sugary drinks on government 
property and to prohibit stores with ten or more employees from displaying candy or sugary 
drinks in the check out aisle, among many others.152 In all cases, the bills failed. 
The Portion Cap Rule attempted to achieve the same result as the prior bills, but in a 
different manner: by limiting the size that can be purchased.153 Thus, it is addressing the same 
policy area that the City Council and State Assemblies in New York City and State have already 
rejected.154 The majority in the Court of Appeals of New York found that inaction on the part of 
both legislatures constituted additional evidence that the Portion Cap Rule was new policy and 
not “preexisting legislative policy.”155 Because it is an area where the Legislatures, both city and 
state, tried and failed to reach an agreement, the Portion Cap Rule violated the third Boreali 
factor. 
D. Was special expertise or technical competence used in the development of the ban?156 
 
In deciding if there was special or technical competence used in formulating the ban, 
there was a split between the trial and appellate divisions. The Supreme Court of New York 
Appellate Division reasoned that because the board did not use any special expertise or technical 
                                                        
151 N.Y.C. Res. No. 1265 (2012) (adding an excise tax on sugar sweetened beverages, failed); N.Y.C. Res. No. 1264 
(2012) (asking the FDA to require warning labels on sugar sweetened beverages, failed); N.Y.C. Res. No. 0768 
(2011) (asking the USDA to authorize N.Y.C. to add some sugary drinks to the list of prohibited goods for city 
residents who receive Food Stamps). 
152 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 A.D. at *28 (citing Assembly Bill No. 
A10010 (prohibits sale of sugar sweetened beverages at FSEs and vending machines on government property, 
failed); Assembly Bill No. S67004 (tax on beverage syrups and soft drinks, failed); Assembly Bill No. A41004 (tax 
on beverage syrups and soft drinks, failed); Assembly Bill No. A10965 (prohibiting purchase of non-nutritious food 
items with Food Stamps, failed)). 
153 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 A.D. at *28. 
154 Id. (“This is a strong indication that the legislature remains unsure of how best to approach the issue of excessive 
sugary beverage consumption.”). 
155 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2014 N.Y. at *23 
156 Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 14. 
24 
competence in developing the rule that it violated the final Boreali factor.157 No expert was 
brought in to create the Portion Cap Rule. The Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division 
found it dispositive that the rule was enacted without any change from its drafting by the 
Mayor’s office.158 
 However, the Supreme Court of New York found that the BOH’s choice to not make 
changes demonstrated an agreement with the language, not a failure to exercise expertise or 
technical competence.159 The Supreme Court of New York reasoned that those persons on the 
BOH have the expertise or technical competence needed to be able to enact a portion cap on 
sugary drinks.160 The Supreme Court of New York further articulated that the development 
requirement of Boreali does not require an agency to draft its own regulations.161 An agency can 
demonstrate expertise and technical competence when, upon challenge, it can show where and 
how the expertise and technical competence was exercised.162 
 The majority in the Court of Appeals of New York found no need to address this part of 
the Boreali test.163 The majority noted that this was not done with the intent to imply that the 
fourth factor was insignificant, merely that “the fact that the rule was adopted with very little 
technical discussion” could alert the courts to a policy-making intent of a regulation.164 
E. Do All Four Factors Need to Be Present to Violate Boreali? 
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One of the issues the City raised in its Motion for Leave to Appeal is whether all four 
factors of the test are required and, if not, how should the factors, once found, be weighed.165 
Boreali itself stated that none of the four factors alone is sufficient to conclude that the 
administrative body usurped the legislature’s power, but that “all of these circumstances, when 
viewed in combination, paint a portrait of an agency that has improperly assumed for 
itself…[that] which characterizes the elected Legislature’s role in our system of government.”166 
The Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division interpreted this to mean that the four 
factors are to be interpreted as “indicators of the usurpation of the legislature, rather than a 
talismanic rule of four required elements that must all be present in every case.”167  
At the trial level, the Supreme Court of New York did not find that all four Boreali 
factors were violated, only three, and yet still found that the rule could not be upheld.168 Contrary 
to the City’s position, the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division is not the first to state 
that all four factors do not need to be present to invalidate a rule because the Boreali Court stated 
it when they made their ruling.169 The majority in the Court of Appeals of New York reiterated 
their position that it is all of the circumstances, when viewed together, that will determine 
whether an agency engaged in policy-making.170  
F. Arbitrary and Capricious Nature of the Ban 
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 Because the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals of 
New York both found that the ban violated separation of powers and the Boreali test, those 
Courts did not discuss the arbitrary and capricious nature of the ban.171 
 The Supreme Court of New York, however, did discuss whether the ban was arbitrary 
and capricious. The Court first looked at whether the ban was reasonable.172 For a ban to be 
reasonable the BOH only needed to demonstrate a reasonable basis for the Portion Cap Rule.173 
This requirement was met and the ban was considered reasonable.174 Yet, the ban’s uneven 
enforcement within a city block paired with its exemptions defeated the stated purpose of the 
ban.175  
The ban does not apply to all FSEs leading to the inability to purchase a large soda at a 
restaurant but the ability to go next door to a corner market and purchase a large soda there.176 
Even Jon Stewart noted the particular ludicrousness of this by stating that convenience stores 
were not regulated because “It’s magic.”177 While the BOH countered that according to the 
MOU, the government is not required to address all facets of a problem at once, the ban was still 
deemed to be arbitrary due to its unevenness.178  
The ban also excluded beverages that have significantly higher concentrations of sugar 
sweeteners or calories and placed no limitations on refills, exclusions which also defeated the 
stated purpose of the ban.179 The BOH argued that convenience drives food purchases and if it is 
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harder to carry more cups people will not do so, but this implied that the rule was designed to 
make consumption a conscious and informed choice.180 These are considerations that the BOH is 
not supposed to weigh when formulating a rule. The Court argued that these exemptions defeated 
the purpose of the rule and “gut” it.181 If the goal is to reduce obesity rates in the city, allowing 
large sugary drinks to remain available at some stores and not others defeats entirely the purpose 
of the ban. 
Part V: The 14th Amendment and Fundamental Liberty Right Concerns 
 The proper constitutional framework, and issue in this case, is whether the BOH, when 
creating the Portion Cap Rule, exceeded its statutory authority and encroached on inherent 
legislative responsibilities thus violating separation of powers. Before a fundamental liberty right 
can be claimed, the rule, legislation, or law, must clear separation of powers hurdles. Separation 
of powers is a concept that has been expressly provided for in the N.Y.C. Charter and is 
considered to be vital to principles of freedom. 182  The Portion Cap Rule clearly violates 
separation of powers in New York City due to former Mayor Bloomberg and the BOH’s attempt 
to usurp the authority of the City Council.183  
However, even though the case was not about fundamental liberty right concerns, much 
of the rhetoric about it, particularly in the media, was centered on fundamental liberty right 
concerns and interests.184 Even Amy Poehler’s hit sitcom, Parks and Recreation, entered the 
collective discussion by having an episode focused solely on a soda ban Leslie Knope was 
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attempting to enact that was similar to the Portion Cap Rule in New York City.185 Generally 
speaking, a statute will be determined to be unconstitutional if it violates a right guaranteed by 
the Bill of Rights or is a fundamental right that has not been expressly provided for in the 
Constitution.186  When determining if something qualifies as a fundamental liberty right not 
expressly guaranteed, the courts look to whether it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered 
liberty and system of justice.”187 Accepting the rhetoric that the Portion Cap Rule was infringing 
on the fundamental liberty right of people to drink as much soda as they wanted, the scrutiny 
level applied would be strict scrutiny review.188  
 Applying strict scrutiny review requires for the government interest in the right to be 
compelling and the manner in which it is carried out to be narrowly tailored to advance the 
state’s compelling interest.189 Even though it can be argued that the government has a compelling 
interest in the health of its citizens, in particular those who are obese due to the cost on the 
healthcare system, the rule was not narrowly tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny. Due to what 
the Supreme Court of New York found to make the ban arbitrary and capricious, these same 
items would imply that the ban was not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest of the 
state.190 Because the ban was not a complete citywide ban but only affected certain FSEs, it 
cannot be argued that it was sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny. If a person can 
go to a store less than 10 feet away and purchase a soda larger than what the ban prohibits 
merely because the establishment does not qualify as an FSE under the Portion Cap Rule, how 
can the ban be tailored enough to advance the state’s compelling interest in the health of its 
                                                        
185 Parks and Recreation: Soda Tax (NBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2012). 
186 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034-36 (2010). 
187 Id. at 3034. 
188 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (using strict scrutiny). 
189 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (explaining that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the 
fetus at the point of viability, but that the Texas statute “swept too broadly” by not providing a distinction between 
pre and post-viability). 
190 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 N.Y. Misc. at *35. 
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citizens? The factors that make the ban arbitrary and capricious are the same factors that would 
lead to the ban failing a fundamental liberty right claim because it is not narrowly tailored. 
However, as much as pundits and the media would like this to be the issue, the actual issue is 
that the ban violated separation of powers and is legislation that was masked as an administrative 
action.191 
Conclusion:  
 The separation of powers doctrine is important to this country at a state and federal level. 
It ensures that there are checks and balances in the governing system. The Portion Cap Rule was 
legislation that an executive agency was trying to pass off as an additional rule to the health code 
of New York City. Executive agencies cannot create laws or do more than what the legislature 
has given them allowance to do. The Soda Ban definitively did not pass three of the Boreali 
factors from the four-part test to determine if an executive or agency action crossed the line into 
legislative territory and was policy-making. In addition, the ban itself with its many exemptions 
led to it being arbitrary and capricious. The City cited no examples of how it would lead to 
people making better choices beyond their reliance on the assumption that people would not 
walk next door or across the street to get a 32 or more ounce soda. To truly enact a large sugary 
drink ban, as former Mayor Bloomberg wanted to, it is necessary for the Board of Health to 
either wait for signs from the City Council that they are ready to pass legislation on the topic or 
remove the exemptions and do a complete citywide ban without any FSE exemptions. Waiting or 
enacting a complete citywide ban are the only ways in which a large sugary drink ban will ever 
pass separation of powers, not be arbitrary and capricious, and will begin to reduce sugary drink 
consumption, and obesity rates, in New York City. 
                                                        
191 This is evidenced by the fact that none of the briefs argued a fundamental liberty right issue, only that the ban 
violates separation of powers in New York due to the four factor test established in Boreali v. Axelrod and is 
arbitrary and capricious. 
